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I. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL: 
Appellants have appealed the variances granted by Clearwater County to Ed and Carole 
Galloway, identified as ZV2011-2. Petitioners raise three issues on appeal: 
1. Do Appellants have standing? 
2. Did the Board's decision prejudice Appellants' substantial rights? 
3. Did the Board error in a manner that requires reversal pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 67-5279(3)? Specifically Appellants argue: 
a. Insufficient evidence was presented to support a finding of "an undue 
hardship because of characteristics of the site." 
b. No relevant findings of fact were made as to whether the requested 
variances would be "injurious to other property in the area in which the 
property is situated". 
c. The Board exceeded its statutory authority by adjudicating the rights of the 
parties with respect to the easement (access road for the subdivision). 
d. Denial by the Board of County Commissioners of the Appellants 
administrative appeal was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion 
because the hardship claimed by the developer was self inflicted. 
II. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS: 
Ed and Carole Galloway (hereinafter Galloway(s)) purchased a 100 acre aliquot parcel of 
land, located in a remote area of Clearwater County, in approximately 1985. (R. p. 34.) The 
property is located within a rural sparsely populated area of Clearwater County. (See photographs 
R. p. 126 - 134) On September 1, 1998, Galloways were granted an access easement, 30 feet in 
total width (15 feet each side of a described centerline) from the Appellant's predecessor in 
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interest, recorded in the property records of Clearwater Count as Instrument 180090. (R. p. 70 -
71) 
On May 23,2006, Galloway filed with Clearwater County an application to subdivide the 
property into ten (10) parcels ranging between six (6) plus acres and twelve (12) plus acres in 
size. The applicants utilized the Class B combined plat procedure identified in the Clearwater 
County Subdivision Ordinance. The subdivision was eventually identified as Southfork Estates. 
(R. p. 107). 
Galloway, on January 11,2011, filed an application for three variances from the 
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, Galloway sought to vary the requirement of 
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance Article 4.D.2, which requires access roads to be built 
within a minimum sixty (60) foot wide right-of-way; to vary the requirements of Clearwater 
County Subdivision Ordinance Article 4.DA.d, which requires access roads to have a minimum 
twenty-four (24) foot road surface or finished width; and to vary the requirement of Article 4.B 
of the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, which requires all arterial, collector, and other 
streets in a proposed subdivision to be dedicated to the public. (R. p. 61) 
It is important to note that the property being subdivided is properly zoned for such a 
subdivision request, and the variances sought focus solely on the nature of the access road. 
Galloways at no time sought to vary the zoning of the land (authorized land use), but merely 
sought to vary the requirements applicable to a single access road. What Galloways sought was a 
variance from a subdivision ordinance, not a zoning ordinance. 
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The Commission, following a disputed public hearing held on March 21,2011, at which 
Galloway and Appellants were present and provided evidence and testimony, granted Galloway 
each of the requested variances, documented by written findings of fact and conclusions oflaw, 
dated April 4, 2011. CR. p. 135.) 
By Clearwater County Ordinance, the Planning and Zoning Commission has final 
authority to determine whether or not to grant a variance, and the ordinance requires no further 
factual public hearing in front of the Board of County Commissioners. Any appeal of that grant 
of variance must be made to the Board of County Commissioners, which hears the appeal as a 
quasi-judicial board. Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, Article VII, Section A; Article 
IX, Section G. 
On March 25,2011, Petitioners filed a notice of appeal of those variance grants, 
challenging the Planning and Zoning Commissions findings. They stated as grounds for appeal 
that no facts or testimony were presented which would authorize the issuances of a variance 
under the terms and conditions of the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance. Further, that 
the easement which the Galloways propose to use for access to the property does not allow that 
road to be utilized for easement for ingress and egress for parties other than Mr. and Mrs. 
Galloway. Finally, that it is not appropriate for a variance to be granted from the requirement 
that access to the subdivision be dedicated for public use. CR. p. 29.) 
The Clearwater County Board of Commissioners, sitting as a quasi judicial board, heard 
the appeal and issued an order remanding the matter to the Planning and Zoning Commission for 
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further findings pursuant to a written order dated July 29,2011. (R. p. 147.) 
Upon remand, the Commission held a subsequent public hearing on August 15,2011, 
took additional testimony and evidence, and granted the requested variances a second time 
pursuant to a written decision setting forth the applicable law and findings of fact, dated 
September 6,2011. (R. p. 140.) 
Appellants filed a second notice of appeal dated August 31, 2011, appealing the decision 
of the Commission to the Board of County Commissioners. (R. p. 34.) 
As grounds for appeal, the appellants argued that the applicant, Galloway, presented 
insufficient evidence to authorize the issuance of a variance. Also that any undue hardship was 
of Galloway's own making, because the property was purchased in 1985, when the existing 
standards were in place, and hardship of the applicant's own making cannot be the grounds for 
the granting of a variance. (R. p. 34.) 
A third issue raised in the appellant's first notice of appeal (which was held by the Board 
of County Commissioners pending remand to the Commission), that the access easement itself 
does not allow for subdivision of the Galloway property. (R. p. 34 - 35) 
Appellants re-asserted as grounds for appeal that it is not appropriate for a variance to be 
granted from the requirement that the access road be dedicated for public use. (R. p. 35) 
The Board of County Commissioners, following a hearing, denied the second appeal and 
filed a written decision, dated November 21,2011. (R. p. 156) 
The Board then finally granted approval of the subdivision plat, by written order, dated 
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December 19, 2011. (R. p. 165) 
Appellants then filed a Petition for Judicial Review. (R. p. 4.) Appellants asked the 
District Court to review the prior proceedings, arguing again that no facts were presented which 
would justify the issuance of a variance, that the easement itself does not allow the access road to 
be utilized for subdivision purposes, and that it isn't proper to vary the requirement that the road 
be dedicated to the public. (R. p. 9) 
Briefing was filed by both parties, and the District Court upon argument, sua sponte, 
issued an opinion finding the Appellants lacked standing in that the Appellants could not show a 
particularized degree of harm. (R. p. 4) The District Court did not address Appellants other 
Issues. 
Appellants subsequently filed this action before the Idaho Supreme Court. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
In an appeal from a district court, where the court was acting in its appellate capacity 
under IDAPA, the Supreme Court reviews the agency record independently of the district court's 
decision. Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508, 148 P.3d 1247, 
1254 (2006). 
As to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, the appellate Court will not 
substitute its judgment for that of the zoning agency. The Court must defer to the agency's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; and the agency's factual determinations are 
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binding on the reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 
long as the determinations are supported by evidence in the record. Payette River Prop. Owners 
Ass'n v. Bd ofComm'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 554, 976 P.2d 477, 480 (1999). 
Planning and zoning decisions are entitled to a strong presumption of validity, including a 
board's application and interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 
148 P.3d at 1254. 
The Court shall affirm the zoning agency's action unless the Court finds that the agency's 
findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (a) in excess of constitutional or statutory 
provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful 
procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(2); Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508, 148 P.3d at 
1254. The party attacking a zoning board's action must first illustrate that the board erred in a 
manner specified therein and then must show that a substantial right of the party has been 
prejudiced. Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 452, 180 P.3d 487,491 (2008). 
I.C. § 67-5279 provides the primary guidance to Courts when hearing judicial review 
petitions or appeals from County planning and zoning decisions. It provides as follows: 
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of 
the evidence on questions of fact. 
(2) When the agency was not required by the provisions of this chapter or by other 
provisions of law to base its action exclusively on a record, the court shall affirm the 
agency action unless the court finds that the action was: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
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(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; or 
(d) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions ofthis chapter or by other provisions 
oflaw to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that 
the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
( c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, agency 
action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced. 
IV. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS: 
A. STANDING: 
Have Appellants shown that a substantial right may be prejudiced by approval of the 
requested variances? 
To gain standing, one must be an "affected person" as contemplated under LLUP A. An 
"affected person" is "one having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by 
the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the development." I.e. § 67-6521(1)(a). To have 
standing in a land-use case, the petitioner needs to allege, not prove, only that the development 
could potentially harm his or her real estate interests. Evans v. Teton Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 
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P.3d 84, 89 (2003). Standing has been found to exist, for example, where the possibility of odor 
being detected by a landowner three miles from a wastewater treatment plant was alleged 
Davisco Foods Int'l, Inc. v. Gooding Cnty., 141 Idaho 784, 786-87, 118 P.3d 116, 118-19 
(2005). Also more recently where the grant of permission to construct new homes may possibly 
exceed the scope of the access easement over property owned by the appellant, and may affect 
emergency vehicles and may lead to gates enclosing cattle being left open. Hawkins v. 
Bonneville County Bd. of Com Irs, 151 Idaho 228, 231-32, 254 P.3d 1224, 1227-28 (2011). 
While Clearwater County does not concede that grounds alleged by Appellants to 
establish standing are ultimately provable, Clearwater County concedes that Appellants have 
alleged a sufficient possibility of harm to establish standing to bring this appeal. 
B. DUE PROCESS / EXCEEDING AUTHORITY: 
Appellants argue that Clearwater County improperly adjudicated the respective easement 
rights between themselves and the developer Galloway, and therefore denied them their right of 
due process, and exceed its legal authority. This argument was raised at the Board of County 
Commissioners appeal level, and was responded to by the Board as follows: 
"In the context of planning and zoning, it is not the practice or policy of the 
Clearwater County Planning and Zoning Commission, or the Board of Commissioners, to 
become embroiled in disputes between landowners regarding the intent of easements 
which have been granted. The County looks at the bare language of the easement itself, 
and if that language appears clear and unambiguous to the County, sufficient to provide a 
right of access to the proposed subdivision, the County will not delve further into the 
intent of the parties regarding that easement. The Clearwater County planning and zoning 
structure is not intended, nor shall be utilized, as a substitute for a court of law to resolve 
easement disputes between landowners. 
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Courts recognize this approach when interpreting easements in general: "In 
construing an easement in a particular case, the instrument granting the easement is to be 
interpreted in connection with the intention of the parties, and the circumstances in 
existence at the time the easement was granted and utilized. Dr. James Cool, D.D.S. v. 
Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass'n, Inc., 139 Idaho 770, 773, 86 P.3d 484,487 
(2004) The existence of ambiguity determines the standard of review of a lower court's 
interpretation of a contract or instrument. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ethington Family Trust, 
137 Idaho 435, 437-38,50 P.3d 450, 452-53 (2002). 
In the absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary 
and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the 
instrument. See Juker v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645, 637 P.2d 792 
793 (1981). C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). 
The easement in question (Appeal Record Section 13) provides a bare, 
unequivocal grant of non-exclusive easements to Galloway, and Galloway'S heirs, 
successors and assigns, with the only limitation being as follows: "This Grant of 
Easements is binding upon and ensures to the benefit of the heirs, assigns, and successors 
of the parties hereto, and the easement for ingress and egress shall not be deemed a public 
right-of-way." 
"Public right-of-way" is a term of art, defined in Idaho Code Section 40-117 (9) as 
a right of way open to the public and under the jurisdiction of the public highway agency, 
where the agency has no obligation to construct or maintain the same. With the grant of 
a variance to Galloway allowing the access road to remain a private, rather than a public 
road, then the easement appears on its face for planning and zoning purposes, to allow for 
development. 
This is not meant nor is to be construed as a finding based upon a disputed hearing 
as to the intent of the parties to the easement itself, but is to be construed as a finding 
solely for agency planning and zoning purposes. R. p. 18. 
Appellants point to Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 264 P .3d 897 (2011) for the 
proposition that any time an interested party objects to a subdivision application on the grounds 
that the easement access does not allow for subdivision, then the County must stay all 
proceedings pending the filing and completion of a lawsuit in the District Court. Further, the 
County must do so automatically, without even a basic review of the bare, plain language of the 
easement itself. Clearwater County respectfully submits this is a mis-reading of the holding in 
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Jasso. 
Jasso involves a request for permission to build homes on real property accessed by a 
road which Camas County required per its subdivision ordinances to be public. There was a 
dispute as to whether or not the road was indeed public. The Jasso Court held specifically as 
follows: 
"Although not necessary to our decision today, we provide the following guidance on 
remand as to the provisions of the Subdivision Ordinance relevant to the parties' dispute. 
If a land use application is submitted and proper access to the land is disputed, 
the decision-maker should make the application's approval expressly contingent 
upon judicial resolution of the access issue. The parties dispute whether a "road 
and utility easement for ingress and egress" is sufficient in scope to permit public 
access to the proposed subdivision. The Board correctly determined that it lacks 
jurisdiction to determine the easement's nature and scope, as questions of property 
ownership must be resolved by a district court. Rural Kootenai Org., Inc. v. Bd of 
Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842,993 P.2d 596, 605 (1999). Since article V, § B(1) 
of the Subdivision Ordinance requires that subdivisions with five or more lots 
have access to a public street or road, the Board may not approve the subdivision 
application until such access is certain. Thus, the Board may condition approval of 
the subdivision application upon a district court's entry of declaratory or final 
judgment that the easement provides the subdivision with the necessary access to 
a public road. See McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 923,88 P.3d 740, 742 
(2004) (affirming district court's judgment as to easement's scope after county 
commissioners made approval of conditional use permit expressly contingent 
upon judicial resolution of scope of the easement)." 
Jasso v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790, 797, 264 P.3d 897, 904 (2011) 
First, the Jasso language relied on by Appellants is fact specific to the Jasso case, and is 
specifically identified as not necessary for the decision made, but is merely guidance to Camas 
County on remand. While Clearwater County has a similar requirement that the subdivision be 
accessed by a public road, Clearwater County granted a variance for this subdivision (see 
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discussion below) varying the requirement that the access easement be dedicated to the public. 
Appellants then argued the easement as varied would not allow for subdivision of the property, 
i.e., arguing the intent of the parties granting an unrestricted private easement for ingress and 
egress. 
This matter differs from Jasso in that Appellants wish to extend fact specific remand 
dicta relating to whether or not a road is public to encompass all private access easement issues 
in all planning and zoning cases statewide, merely upon an unsupported allegation that the 
easement itself does not mean what the bare language of the easement states. Appellants 
forward this argument while steadfastly refusing, even though being invited, to file any quiet title 
action in District Court. 
The specific issue in Jasso was actually whether or not the County improperly approved 
the subdivision while conditionally holding that no building permits would issue until the access 
issue was resolved, thereby removing the matter from public comment. Again, the quoted 
language was not necessary to resolve that issue. See Appellant's Brief, Stephen V. JASSO, and 
Curtis and Carnie Gorringe, husband and wife, Petitioners-Respondents, v. CAMAS COUNTY 
IDAHO, a political subdivision of the State ofIdaho, Defendant-Appellant., 2010 WL 3497345 
(Idaho), 21-22 
The Catch 22: 
When reviewing any subdivision application a County must conduct a bare review of the 
applicant's right to use an access road, whether private or public, to ensure the ordinance 
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requirements have been met. The application procedure requires "proof of adequate access to a 
public street". Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance 34 Section G (l)(d). Further, 
Clearwater County must complete the hearing process within a specified time frame: 
"All Class A & Class B subdivisions must have the hearing process completed within six 
(6) months of the first Planning and Zoning commission hearing date. All other 
applications must have the hearing process completed within three (3) months of the first 
Planning and Zoning Commission hearing date." 
Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance 34, Article III, Section B. 
This time requirement in the ordinance arises from an State mandate. I.C. 67-6521 ( c) 
provides: 
After a hearing, the commission or governing board may: 
(i) Grant or deny an application; or 
(ii) Delay such a decision for a definite period of time for further study or hearing. 
Each commission or governing board shall establish by ordinance or resolution a 
time period within which a recommendation or decision must be made. 
To adopt a ruling as requested by Appellants would mean that no County could finalize 
the hearing process as ordinance and statute require, so long as any interested party to the 
subdivision proceeding challenged the intent of the parties to the access easement, no matter how 
spurious that challenge may be. 
Secondly, the argument would prohibit the County from engaging in a review of the 
access easements at all, which puts the County at odds with its own ordinances reasonably 
requiring such a review. 
While it is true that Clearwater County does not have authority to finally determine 
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respective property rights between landowners, Clearwater County must conduct a limited review 
of those rights with respect to easements. Clearwater County recognized this limited review 
obligation, and went to great pains to explain its position, including stating specifically that its 
decision was for administrative planning and zoning purposes, and is in no way to be deemed a 
substitute for a court of law decision. The Shinns have always, and indeed still have the ability 
to file a quiet title action in District Court. 
If they prevail, the District Court opinion will obviously trump or overtum any 
subdivision approval of Clearwater County. By refusing to file such an action instead relying on 
the planning and zoning process to forward their claim that the easement is inadequate for 
subdividing, the Appellants have created the very situation about which they now complain, and 
have utilized the same process to arguably reach the result they dispute, i.e. interruption of 
property rights of parties by Clearwater County, rather than the District Court, only the 
interruption would be of the Galloway's property rights. 
What if Clearwater County were to deny the subdivision request following a grant of a 
variance to allow the access road to remain private, because Appellants claimed the easement 
intent would prohibit subdivision, keeping in mind that Clearwater County must have the process 
completed within three months of the first hearing by Planning and Zoning of the variance 
application? Under the Appellants' suggested approach, then Galloway would have cause to 
claim that Clearwater County unreasonably and without lawful authority engaged in 
interpretation of Galloway's property rights. 
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What would be created is an untenable position for the County, who is mandated to reach 
a final decision within a specific time period, while also being subject to a mandate not to reach a 
final decision. 
Clearwater County submits that more appropriate guidance to a planning and zoning 
board should be as follows: First, the Court should recognize that when reviewing a subdivision 
application, Clearwater County has an obligation to conduct a limited review to ensure proper 
access exists, and to do so within the required time frames, i.e., do the recorded documents on 
their face provide clear and unambiguous qualifying access to the property being subdivided. 
Second, the Court should also recognize that such a review is for administrative purposes only, 
and should an interested party file a proper lawsuit to specifically identify the relative property 
rights of the parties, that holding is controlling. 
C. DID THE BOARD ERR IN A MANNER THAT REOUIRES REVERSAL 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE SECTION 67-5279? 
1. Appellants argue an incorrect standard of law: That insufficient evidence 
was presented to support a finding of "an undue hardship because of characteristics 
of the site." per Idaho Code Section 67-6516. 
Appellant's reliance on Idaho Code Section 67-6516 is misplaced. 
Title 67-6501 et. seq. (the Local Land Use Planning Act, or LLUPA) is the primary 
delegation of land use planning and regulation to the Counties. The Idaho Court of Appeals, in 
Worley Hwy. Dist. vs. Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833, 663 P.2d 1135 (Ct. App. 1983), 
succinctly summarized this delegation of the police power as follows: "In enacting the Local 
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Planning Act of 1975, the legislature intended to give local governing boards broad powers in the 
area of planning and zoning." 
I.e. §67-6511 provides a mandate that each county establish zoning districts, setting 
regulations for construction standards or use of buildings, lot occupancy, size of lots, open 
spaces, and other uses. In addition, I.C. §67-6513 requires each county to provide by ordinance 
standards and processes for applications for subdivision permits. At issue here are applications 
for subdivision permits and variances from those requirements. 
There is a distinct difference between land use zones and subdivisions. Both Idaho 
statutes and Clearwater County ordinances deal with them separately (zoning ordinances are 
found in Ordinance 35B, subdivision ordinances are found in Ordinance 34). This distinction is 
importmlt because the Idaho Code provision (I.C. §67-6516) that the petitioner claims is in 
conflict with the Clearwater County subdivision ordinances applies to zoning only, not 
subdivisions. Specifically: 
"Each governing board shall provide, as part of the zoning ordinance, for the processing 
of applications for variance permits ... " I.C. §67-6516. 
At issue here is a subdivision application, not a zoning issue. 
For example, a similar argument was made in Blaha v. Bd. of Ada County Com/rs, 134 
Idaho 770, 9 P.3d 1236 (2000), in which the petitioners argued that Ada County had no authority 
to grant a variance to road width, placement and design issues because those were outside the 
scope ofI.C. §67-6516. The Court held: 
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" As defined in the Local Land Use Planning Act, a variance is a modification of the bulk 
and placement requirements of the zoning ordinance as to lot configuration or building 
size and location. I.C. § 67-6516. The variances to intersection design, road width and 
grade specifications, which are involved here but not itemized in the statute, are therefore 
not governed by the standards found in 1. C. §67 -6516." 
Blaha 134 Idaho at 774, 9P.3d at 1240. 
In short, Idaho counties are required to provide ordinances establishing standards for 
subdivisions (I.C. §67-6513). Implicit in this authority to establish standards is the authority to 
establish a procedure to vary those standards. That procedure is not the procedure set out in I.C. 
§67-6516, which applies only to zoning issues. Idaho counties have authority to establish their 
own variance procedures for subdivisions. 
Clearwater County has done so. CCSO Article VIII sets for the criteria for granting a 
subdivision variance. It provides specifically as follows: 
Section A. Purpose: The Commission may grant, as a result of unique circumstances 
such as topographical-physical limitations or a planned unit deVelopment, a variance, as 
herein defined, from the provisions of this Ordinance on a finding that undue hardship 
results from the strict compliance with specific provisions of requirements of this 
Ordinance or that the application of such requirements or provision is impracticable. 
Section B. Findings: No variance, as herein defined, shall be favorably acted upon by the 
Commission unless there is a finding, as a result of a public hearing, that all of the 
following exist: 
1. That there are such special circumstances or conditions affecting the property 
that the strict application of the provisions of this Ordinance would clearly be 
impracticable or unreasonable and cause and undue hardship. 
2. That strict compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance would result in 
extraordinary topography, or such other conditions would result in inhibiting the 
achievement ofthe objectives of the Ordinance. 
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3. That the granting of the specified variance will not be detrimental to the public 
welfare or injurious to other property in the area in which the property is situated. 
4. That such variance will not violate the provisions of the Idaho Code. 
5. That such variance will not have the effect of nullifYing the interest and purpose 
of this Ordinance and the Comprehensive Plan. 
As discussed above, I.C. §67-6516 does not apply to subdivisions, including requests for 
variances in subdivision ordinances. However, even if it did, the Appellants' definition of "site" 
in the context of Clearwater County's ordinances is in error. While no specific definition of 
"site" exists in Clearwater County Ordinance (indeed the subdivision variance ordinance 
discusses conditions "affecting the property"), it is clear from other contexts that access roads are 
to be considered part of the "site" or are conditions "affecting the property". 
For example, a subdivision application requires a subdivision plat map identifYing the 
property being subdivided together with access roads and easements, whether public or private, 
connecting that property to a public street. Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance Article III, 
Section 1. 18 
The definition of "map" includes access roads. Clearwater County Subdivision 
Ordinance Article II, Definitions. 
Design standards for interior roads in a subdivision, as well as exterior access roads, are 
specified. Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance Article 4, Section D. 
It is clear that the term "site", if applied to a subdivision under the Clearwater County 
Subdivision scheme, includes access roads and easements. 
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2. Applying the correct standard, a sufficient factual basis was established for a 
finding of "undue hardship". 
Undue hardship, as contemplated by the Clearwater County Subdivision Ordinance, is not 
defined either in the Ordinance or in the Idaho Code. There exists limited guidance in State law, 
and that guidance is provided generally within the context of variances from zoning decisions 
rather than subdivisions. Ultimately, this Court is instructed to provide planning and zoning 
decisions a strong presumption of validity, including the agency's application and interpretation 
of its own zoning ordinances. 
Thus, what constitutes an undue hardship depends on how the Planning and Zoning 
Commission and the Board of County Commissioners interpret that term, rather than how Courts 
interpret that term, and so long as the County's decision is not arbitrary, it cannot be reversed on 
these grounds. 
In determining how to define "undue hardship" Clearwater County did not act arbitrarily. 
Clearwater County looked to other bodies of law to help define the term, stating as follows: 
"The requirement to show an "undue hardship" exists in State statute as well (I.C. 
67-5279). There exists limited guidance from state ofIdaho statutes or case law as to 
what constitutes an "undue hardship". Undue hardship is some condition which is 
analyzed on a case by case basis (Wohrle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 207 P.3d 
998 (2009) due to characteristics of the site (Wohrle at 147 Idaho 273-274; 207 P.3d 
1004-05), or due to special circumstances or conditions, which are peculiar to the 
property and not applicable generally to land or buildings in the neighborhood (Burley v. 
McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 909, 693 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Idaho App., 1984), and 
which is not in conflict with the public interest. I.C. § 67-5279. An undue hardship can 
be created due to exorbitant expense of a requirement not justified by the development, 
such as with respect to excessive road construction requirements to support a relatively 
few number of daily vehicle trips caused by the development (see Blaha v. Board of Ada 
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County Com 'rs, 134 Idaho 770, 773, 9 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Idaho 2000) for a Board of 
County Commissioners finding of undue hardship due to an expense vs. benefit analysis, 
cited with approval by the reviewing court)." Decision of Board of County 
Commissioners on Appeal, R. p. 159. 
While many of the cases reviewed by Clearwater County dealt with zoning issues, rather 
than subdivision issues, one case (Blaha supra) discussed not only subdivision issues, but road 
design and specifications. In Blaha, the developer sought a variance from Ada County relating to 
road design and construction, arguing that it was unduly restrictive to require extensive 
re-alignment and grading of a private road providing access to a proposed subdivision when the 
anticipated traffic would be only eighty trips per day. The developer had previously obtained a 
waiver of those requirements from the Ada County Highway District, and subsequently sought a 
variance from the Ada County Planning and Zoning Commission. 
In Blaha, the Ada County Board of Commissioners found that strict enforcement of the 
Ada County Highway District policies would require road work and expense not justified by a 
development generating only eighty vehicle trips per day. Blaha v. Bd. of Ada County Com'rs, 
134 Idaho 770, 773, 9 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2000) 
The Blaha court ultimately found the petition for a variance to the County was 
unnecessary because the Ada County Highway District had primary authority to waive the road 
design requirements and had done so prior to the variance being granted. Implicit in this finding 
is the conclusion that the cost and expense of road construction compared to the benefit to be 
gained from the road construction is a proper analysis. 
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Regardless, whether a cost/benefit analysis is appropriate in Clearwater County for a 
variance of a Clearwater County subdivision requirement is a determination to be made by 
Clearwater County, not the Court. 
It is important to keep in mind the context of this case. We are not talking about a 
landowner wanting to use his property in violation of use restrictions. This is a case where 
Galloway wants to use their property for the same purpose as the Appellants, i.e., for 
single-family residential purposes. At issue here is merely the access road from a public road 
(Middle Road) to the Galloway's property itself, and its width and nature (public vs. private). 
The Planning and Zoning Commission found, pursuant to the order dated April 4, 2011 
(R. p. 135), and the order dated September 6, 2011, (R. p. 140), that Galloway had presented 
sufficient evidence to authorize the issuance of the requested variances. 
The Planning and Zoning Commission made detailed and exhaustive findings of fact and 
conclusions of law with respect to the ordinance elements of a subdivision variance. Those are 
found following the heading FINDINGS OF FACT (R. p. 142). Due to the length, they are not 
set forth herein. 
In addition to the testimony highlighted by the Planning and Zoning Commission's 
decision, staff investigation reports incorporated into the decision by reference further document 
the facts leading to a finding of undue hardship. (R. p. 91 - 106) 
Appellants first argue that an expense vs. benefit analysis in consideration of a request for 
a variance from subdivision requirements is inappropriate, arguing that City of Burley v. 
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McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906,693 P.2d 1108 (Ct. App. 1984) holds as such. 
City of Burley does not apply to this situation. First, City of Burley considered a zoning 
variance rather than a subdivision variance. The property in Burley was zoned for only single or 
double residential use. The landowner wanted to remodel a building from a duplex to a triplex, g 
use not authorized in the particular zone in which the land was situated. As City of Burley 
involved a zoning variance (as opposed to subdivision), the Burley court properly focused as the 
controlling law on I. C. § 67-6516, stating: 
The next question is whether the zoning board properly granted the variance for a triplex. 
Idaho Code § 67-6516 provides that a variance "may be granted ... only upon a showing 
of undue hardship because of characteristics of the site and that the variance is not in 
conflict with the public interest." 
City of Burley v. McCaslin Lumber Co., 107 Idaho 906, 909, 693 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Ct. 
App.1984) 
Here, Galloway seeks to subdivide the property into multiple ten-acre lots for residential 
purposes. This is a use of the property entirely permitted by the Clearwater County zoning 
ordinances. The subdivision ordinances of Clearwater County exist merely to ensure orderly 
development for authorized uses, not to establish which use is proper or improper. Clearwater 
County Subdivision Ordinance Article 1, Section C. Purpose. 
As the Blaha (supra) court established, I.C. § 67-6516 does not apply to subdivision 
variance requests, only to zoning variance requests. The controlling ordinances then are those 
established by Clearwater County, as interpreted by Clearwater County, which applies a cost / 
benefit analysis as part of the process (not the exclusive analysis, but certainly part of it). Other 
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language from the Blaha court, quoting an Ada County Planning and Zoning finding that the 
exorbitant cost of the road construction, compared to the small anticipated benefit, leads again to 
the conclusion that a cost / benefit analysis is appropriate in the context of subdivision 
ordinances and roads. 
Regardless, the decision granting Galloway a variance for certain access road issues was 
not solely based on a cost/benefit analysis. The impossibility of obtaining a larger easement, the 
rural nature of the area not lending itself to further development, the adequacy of the road to 
handle the anticipated traffic, the approval of the road as varied by the local ambulance district, 
the local fire district, and the County highway department, are all examples which when coupled 
with the exorbitant and unnecessary cost of developing a road under the circumstances as they 
exist with the Galloway subdivision were all properly considered by the Commission when 
granting the variance. 
Appellants also argue that any undue hardship was created by Galloway, citing Dawson 
Enterprises, Inc. V Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 567 P.2d 1257 (1977) for the proposition that 
self inflicted undue hardship cannot be considered when granting a variance. Specifically, this 
argument boils down to an assertion that since Galloway purchased the land in question in 1985, 
at a time when the existing ordinances were in effect; therefore, he caused his own hardship by 
purchasing land knowing development would require a variance. 
Dawson does not apply to this situation, and furthermore Dawson does not hold that 
self-created undue hardships automatically mean that no variance can be granted, but is merely a 
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single factor to be considered - in a zoning change case. As Dawson is a zoning variance case 
involving 1. C. §67 -6516 (discussed above). It is not applicable to the issue of a subdivision 
vanance. 
In Dawson, the applicant owned an option to purchase land zoned for agricultural and 
residential uses only. Dawson filed a request for a land use change (zoning change), seeking to 
have the parcel covered by his option zoned as commercial for use as an automobile dealership. 
He then gambled on gaining the zoning change, exercised his purchase option, bought the land, 
and claimed (among other things) that an undue financial hardship would now arise if the zoning 
change was not allowed because the property would be worth far less than he paid for it. 
Dawson Enterprises, Inc. v. Blaine County, 98 Idaho 506, 516, 567 P.2d 1257, 1267 (1977). 
Dawson presents facts very different from this case. First, Dawson is a zoning case, 
where the use being requested by the petitioner was not allowed. Unlike Dawson, the use 
intended by Galloway has been allowed for well over thirty years, and was allowed at the time he 
purchased the property over twenty years ago. Galloway requested a variance merely to change 
the road easement and width requirements incidental to an already allowed use. 
Second, Dawson involves an analysis of "spot zoning", something entirely absent from 
this case. Changing the land use for a specific parcel of land to something the entire 
neighborhood is not zoned for presents a very different question than obtaining a variance for a 
road easement and width to support an already authorized and allowed use. Spot zoning is 
something the Dawson court spent significant time discussing. Of note, all cases citing Dawson 
23 
involve spot zoning or requests for variances to change land use entirely, rather than variances 
for roads incidental to an already authorized land use. 
Over twenty years elapsed before Galloway sought to subdivide his property. Dawson 
filed a request for a zoning change, and then purchased the property intentionally to create an 
undue hardship. 
Appellants further argue that the Clearwater County Board of Commissioners "correctly 
concluded that the self-inflicted nature of an undue hardship is a factor for consideration", a 
matter not considered by Planning and Zoning, it failed to remand the case to Planning and 
Zoning for further hearings. (Appellant' Brief p. 22) 
First, Appellants failed to raise the issue of undue hardship at the Planning and Zoning 
level. 
Second, this misstates the decision of the Board of County Commissioners. The Board 
described at length why Dawson, and the self inflicted nature of a hardship did not apply to a 
subdivision variance request, nor to the facts of this case, ultimately stating: 
"Dawson and those cases cited therein go on to describe that self inflicted hardship, if it 
exists, is a factor in whether or not to grant or deny a variance, but is not controlling. 
Therefore, this Board of Commissioners cannot say that the Planning and Zoning 
Commission abused its discretion when deciding to grant the variances in spite of the 
argument of self inflicted hardship and finds in favor of Galloway on this issue." ( R. p. 
17) 
At no time did the Board identify a self inflicted hardship as being a factor to be 
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considered in the context of the Clearwater County subdivision ordinances. 
3. Sufficient findings of fact were made as to whether the requested variances 
would be "detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to other property in 
the area in which the property is situated". 
The Planning and Zoning Commission has entered two written decisions in this matter, 
dated April 4, 2011 (R. p. 135) and September 6, 2011 (R. p. 149), following public hearings. In 
both decisions the proper ordinance is identified. In both decisions, a specific holding is made 
that the ordinance conditions were met. 
In the first decision, the P&Z Commission recites evidence received from Galloway that: 
"The public welfare is not impacted at all since the changes will not have an impact on 
emergency vehicles. Nor will it impact other owners in the area as the design and 
implementation is entirely within parameters of the deeded RlW [right of way] and the 
original (approved) plat. Carole and I are doing this low density sub with applicable 
CC&Rs to limit impact on the neighbors both visually and physically." R. p. 137. 
In the second decision, the P&Z Commission added the following: 
"The purpose of the subdivision ordinances in general are set forth in Article I, Section C 
of the Subdivision Ordinance and is not re-printed here. The Commission finds strict 
compliance with the requirements of the ordinance do inhibit the achievement of the 
objectives as stated, including orderly development, given the unique circumstances of 
the subject property. Alternatively, the variances being granted do not impede or be 
detrimental to the public welfare, or injurious to the public welfare or be injurious to 
other property in the area, will not violate the provisions ofIdaho Code, nor will nullifY 
the interest and purpose of the Ordinance or Comprehensive Plan." 
In its second decision, under the heading "FINDINGS OF FACT" (beginning at R. p. 
142) the P&Z Commission detailed its evidence and findings, most of which is applicable to a 
finding that neighboring properties will not be injured. Again, due to the length those findings 
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and conclusions are not re-printed here. Those findings conclude with the following: 
11. Would strict compliance with the requirements of the Ordinance result in 
inhibiting the achievement of the objectives of the Ordinance, or nullify the 
purpose of the Ordinance or the Comprehensive Plan. 
a. The purpose of the subdivision ordinances in general are set forth in 
Article I, Section C of the Subdivision Ordinance and is not re-printed 
here. The Commission finds strict compliance with the requirements of 
the ordinance do inhibit the achievement of the objectives as stated, 
including orderly development, given the unique circumstances of the 
subject property. Alternatively, the variances being granted to (sic) not 
impede or be detrimental to the public welfare, or injurious to the public 
welfare or be injurious to other property in the area, will not violate the 
provisions of Idaho Code, nor will nullify the interest and purpose of the 
Ordinance or Comprehensive Plan. (R. p. 146) 
V. CONCLUSION: 
Clearwater County's grant of variances to the subdivision ordinances relating to access 
roads to the Galloways was not in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, made in 
excess of statutory authority of the agency, made upon unlawful procedure or arbitrary, 
capricious or an abuse of discretion. The County went to great pains to ensure a proper process 
and proper consideration of elements as established by County ordinance. This includes an 
approach to reach a delicate balance between the jurisdiction of the District Court and the 
obligations on the County with respect to the scope and nature of the easement at issue. 
The Appellants reliance to support their position on zoning law is misplaced, both in their 
application ofI.C. 67-6516 and in their reliance on zoning court decisions arising from 
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application ofLC. 67-6516. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the County's grant of variances. 
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